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\$ _____ payment enclosed or
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Print Name _____

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PARADE'S SPECIAL

INTELLIGENCE REPORT®

Because of volume of mail received,
Parade regrets it cannot answer queries

New Year's Greetings Over the Hot Line



Yeltsin and Clinton at 1994 meeting: If the pair use their private line today, they may get a busy signal

top-level security code "Eyes Only—The President." An accompanying fax will show an image of the Kremlin.

The hot line was established in August 1963 by President Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The campaign for a private line between the White House and the Kremlin had

New Year's greetings will be exchanged today over the world's most exclusive telecommunications link—the hot line between Moscow and Washington, D.C. A relic of the Cold War, the "MOLINK" (its Pentagon code name) still exists for the sole use of Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin on most days. Each Jan. 1, however, the two teams that maintain the hot line use it to exchange greetings.

To send its "Happy New Year" message, the U.S. team won't use a red phone on the President's desk, as myth has it, but rather a Teletype machine, a fax and computers at the Pentagon—linked to the Kremlin in Moscow via two satellite systems and an undersea cable. In return, the Russian New Year's greeting, С НОВЫМ ГОДОМ (pronounced *Es Novyim Godem*), will emerge from the Teletype, bearing the

been begun in 1960 by the late Jess Gorkin, then PARADE's editor. In the uncertain climate of the Cold War, Americans feared that a nuclear war might be precipitated, in JFK's words, "at any moment by accident, miscalculation or madness."

Today the hot line is rarely used. George Bush was the first U.S. President to replace it with friendly phone calls (to Russian President Gorbachev), and Clinton and Yeltsin speak regularly by phone these days.

The old hot line has been supplemented by a defensive "partnership line," which runs through commercial phone circuits, with scramblers for secure conversations. In a crisis, the Secretary of Defense can reach his Kremlin counterpart in seconds. And, of course, a computer links the President and our allies around the world.

Prayer in Schools: Our Readers Respond

Nearly 40,000 readers dialed a 900 number to respond to questions in our Nov. 27 "Fresh Voices" cover story on prayer in public schools. Asked if prayers should be spoken aloud daily in the schools, 48.8% said "yes," while 46.5% said "no." More respondents (65.6%) would permit a moment of silence.

Asked if a coach should be allowed to conduct a team prayer before a public-school

athletic event, 64.8% said "yes," while 30.3% said "no."

Finally, asked if our national leaders "were setting good moral examples" for young people, only 7.9% said "yes," while a whopping 84.7% said "no." Local leaders fared a bit better, getting "yes" votes from 23.7% and "no" from 69.3%.

The largest voting bloc was aged 36 to 50. Some callers didn't answer every question, so totals don't equal 100%

COPY LIBRARY

WASHINGTON-MOSCOW "HOT-LINE" EXCHANGE

9

| | | | | |
|------|----------|-----------|-------------|--|
| Page | | | | |
| 2. | June 5, | 7:47 am. | Kosygin | UAR - Israel Fighting |
| 4. | June 5, | 8:15 am. | White House | Relay of Rusk to Gromyko Message on Hostilities |
| 6. | June 5, | 8:47 am. | Johnson | Actions to End Hostilities |
| 8. | June 6, | 5:34 am. | Kosygin | Call for Cease-Fire and Withdrawal |
| 10. | June 6, | 10:03 am. | Johnson | UN Negotiations - UAR Charges |
| 12. | June 6, | 6:07 pm. | Kosygin | Negotiations at UN |
| 14. | June 6, | 7:45 pm. | Johnson | Cease-Fire Resolution Agreed |
| 16. | June 7, | 8:18 am. | Kosygin | Cease-Fire Ignored |
| 18. | June 7, | 11:00 am. | Johnson | Status of Cease-Fire |
| 20. | June 8, | 9:48 am. | Kosygin | Status of Cease-Fire |
| 22. | June 8, | 11:00 am. | Johnson | USS Liberty |
| 24. | June 8, | 11:35 pm. | Johnson | Cease-Fire Actions |
| 26. | June 8, | 12:20 pm. | Kosygin | USS Liberty |
| 28. | June 8, | 3:36 pm. | Johnson | USS Liberty |
| 30. | June 10, | 8:48 am. | Kosygin | Israel Continues Fighting |
| 32. | June 10, | 9:30 am. | Johnson | Assurances from Israel |
| 34. | June 10, | 9:44 am. | Kosygin | Fighting Continuing |
| 36. | June 10, | 10:50 am. | Johnson | Status of Ceasefire |
| 38. | June 10, | 11:31 am. | Kosygin | Next Steps |
| 40. | June 10, | 11:54 am. | Johnson | Military Action Ending |

*From NSC History, Mid East Crisis
Vol. 7, Appendix G-H, Box 19*

Sept. 18, 1988

MOSCOW'S STILL HOLDING

Twenty-five Years on the Hot Line

By Webster Stone


INSIDE A WINDOWLESS ROOM in the heart of the Pentagon, a set of antiquated encryption/decryption machines suddenly start to percolate. The whir prompts a gray-haired Army colonel to glance up at three oversize digital clocks labeled "ZULU" (Greenwich mean time), and, in Russian, "WASHINGTON" and "MOSCOW." It's 10:57 A.M., Eastern Standard Time. "That's Ivan's 'call-up' coming in just before the hour," says Col. Donald L. Siebenaler. The hot line — Washington's 24-hour electronic link to Moscow — is being tested, as it has been every hour of every day since it was inaugurated 25 years ago.

An Army sergeant quickly punches in

Webster Stone is currently in the Middle East writing a political thriller.

a prescribed combination of keystrokes authenticating that Washington is ready to receive the test message. Seconds pass. The computer's cursor idly blinks. Then, on Moscow's command, the teleprinter clickety-clacks out the automatically decoded message in Cyrillic characters. "It's about hunters and wolves," remarks Colonel Siebenaler, an intelligence officer fluent in Russian.

Contrary to popular belief, the hot line, formally known to the Americans as the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link (the Russians reverse the capitals' names), is not a red telephone atop the President's Oval Office desk. It is, rather, two separate systems, one teletype, one facsimile, at the Pentagon's National Military Command Center, in what might be mistaken for the computer room of an affluent high school. The difference is that here, incoming messages always carry the highest security classification: "Eyes Only — The President." The Moscow operation,



PALL HOSEFROS/THE NEW YORK TIMES

Col. Donald Siebenaler, right, and Sgt. David Groves send one of the hourly hot-line tests.

widely presumed to be Kremlin, is, Leonid Brezhnev once told a group of Moscow-based American journalists, on the opposite side of Red Square in the Communist Party Headquarters; it is manned by civilians.

Here's how it works. On those rare occasions when an official Soviet Government message is received, MOLINK (short for Moscow-link) immediately translates it into English and sends both the Russian and English text by an untappable fax line to the Situation Room in the White House basement, which is staffed around the clock by military personnel. If the message were to suggest an imminent disaster, such as an accidental nuclear strike, the MOLINK team would call the Situation Room duty officer and "gist" the main elements to him for prompt relaying to the President; this is quickly followed up by a meticulously translated message. When away from the White House, the President can be quickly "patched" into MOLINK through special equipment that accompanies him at all times.

THE EXACT NUMBER of times the hot line has been used is secret because only the President is authorized to declassify such information. But some instances can be culled from Presidential memoirs. Perhaps the most intense period of use came during the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War in 1967. The very first official message ever transmitted was received in Washington on June 5. Just before 8 A.M., President Johnson recalled in his memoirs, "The Vantage Point," Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called him in his White House bedroom and announced: "Mr. President, the hot line is up." After an Israeli pre-emptive strike against Arab countries, the Soviet leader Alexei Kosygin sent a message saying that his country's forces would stay out of the pending conflict if the United States agreed to do likewise. The President readily agreed.

A few days later, after a United States communications ship was accidentally torpedoed off the Sinai Peninsula, an American carrier task force moved into the area to rescue survivors. Worried that the Soviet Union might misinterpret the Sixth Fleet's maneuvers as intervention, President Johnson sent a message explaining the action. And when it ap-

peared that Israeli troops might advance on Damascus, Johnson assured Kosygin he was pressing the Israelis for a cease-fire, and the Israelis did stop short of the Syrian capital. Secretary McNamara later said that the hot line had proved "very useful" in preventing what could have become a direct American-Soviet confrontation.

The hot line was also used in 1971 during the Indo-Pakistani War; during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when there was a United States nuclear alert; in 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus; in 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and several times during the Reagan Administration, with the Russians querying about events in Lebanon and the United States commenting on the situation in Poland.

The hot line is also known to have been used in noncrisis situations. During Salt II negotiations, when President Jimmy Carter's personal letters to General Secretary Brezhnev were repeatedly answered in a style one United States security adviser suggested "had been written by the 14th sub-secretary of the Foreign Ministry," Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, recommended that the President send his communications over the hot line. It got Brezhnev's attention, all right, but one White House participant recalls that the Russians, who take use of the hot line very seriously, replied with something akin to: "Please don't ever do that again!"

THE PRESIDENT MAY have sole discretion over official hot-line communiqués, but the MOLINK staff shoulders the prodigious and monotonous responsibility of continually testing the equipment to make certain the lines are in proper working order.

Five two-person military teams — each consisting of a communicator, a noncommissioned officer who can deal with the idiosyncrasies of the equipment, and a commissioned officer translator — attend the hot line on rotating eight-hour shifts. In addition to keeping up their language capabilities, translators are expected to stay current on world politics by reading a variety of newspapers and periodicals and by attending regular intelligence briefings.

But every hour, without fail, they transmit or receive test messages. Only on New Year's and Aug. 30, the hot-line's anni-

versary, do the two staffs depart from routine messages to exchange greetings.

On this side of the hot line the chief of the MOLINK branch is charged with accumulating new test messages. The Americans sometimes send Shakespeare, the Russians Chekov. The Americans also send passages from the encyclopedia, Mark Twain and even a first-aid manual. Most important, Colonel Siebanaler pointed out shortly before he turned over his post as chief of MOLINK to Army Col. Thomas C. O'Keefe, is: to "make sure there is no innuendo." A passage concerning Winnie-the-Pooh getting his head stuck in a honey jar might, for instance, be considered an affront to the Russians, whose unofficial national symbol is the bear.

SEVERAL PEOPLE have been credited with the idea of a direct communications link between the two superpower leaders, including Prof. Thomas Schelling of Harvard, a political economist and former nuclear-strategist who, in 1961, had worked on a Defense Department study project called War by Accident, Miscalculation and Surprise. But Schelling says it is less a question of who came up with the idea first than a general realization that such a fundamentally crucial means for communications did not exist. Such oversight, Schelling says, was not uncommon at the time. "It was like Robert McNamara discovering there were no combination locks on nuclear weapons. He almost fell out of his chair."

Schelling credits popular fiction — especially Peter Bryant's 1958 novel "Red Alert" — with making people in government aware of the omission.

While the proposal for a direct link kicked around inside Government, a formidable campaign had already begun in the public arena to adopt the measure. The primary leader was Jess Gorkin, editor of Parade, who in 1960 published an open letter in his magazine to President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, concluding with: "Must a world be lost for want of a telephone call?" Letters from enthusiastic readers poured in.

A self-styled citizen diplomat, Gorkin badgered Presidential candidates John Kennedy and Richard Nixon into considering his idea. At a re-

(Continued on Page 67)

HOT LINE

Continued from Page 60

ception given in Khrushchev's honor during a visit to the United States, Gorkin managed to buttonhole the Soviet leader and get him to acknowledge that the idea had merit.

But there were powerful opponents. The State Department and the military objected. Gorkin reported that they didn't like the idea of the President talking behind their backs to the Russians. And the Kremlin stubbornly refused to consider any United States arms-control measure short of general and complete disarmament.

The hot-line proposal languished until the autumn of 1962, when the Cuban missile crisis dramatically demonstrated the urgent need for a direct communications link. Messages between Kennedy and Khrushchev took more than six hours to deliver through regular diplomatic channels, so both Governments resorted to public statements as the fastest way to communicate. The Soviet Union went so far as to have one of its embassy counselors, Aleksandr Fomin, a K.G.B. officer, give the ABC-TV correspondent John Scali several messages to convey to the White House.

After the crisis was resolved, the hot-line proposal became an immediate priority, and an agreement was signed in Geneva in June 1963. When the hot line became fully operational on Aug. 30, Washington's first message, "The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog's back 1234567890," hardly compared with the Russians' initial transmission, a poetic description of Moscow's setting sun. Ever since, test messages have been transmitted every even hour from Washington in English and in Russian every odd hour from Moscow.

THE HOT LINE began to catch up with modern technology in 1984, when the two countries agreed to upgrade the system for facsimile transmission. Now, maps, charts, texts and photographs can be sent almost instantaneously.

Three separate links now make up the hot line, redundancy insuring that a message will always get through. An American commercial satellite, INTELSAT, and a Soviet Government satellite

each carry a line of communication, and the original 1963 European cable provides the third circuit. Whenever suggestions are made to scrap the original cable, the Russians balk. As a former hot-line specialist describes it: "They say, 'Ah, no. That's the wedding ring, the tie that binds us.'"

If Ted Koppel can get United States and Soviet officials together on a "Night-line" teleconference call from their respective capitals, many wonder why the hot line does not adopt a similar technique. But high-ranking American military officials argue that if leaders could see each other's faces as they speak, it could lead to misunderstandings, hasty decisions and lost tempers.

The two nations are, however, interested in having more hot lines between them. Last year, the American and Soviet Governments agreed to Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. Now operational, they are staffed in the United States by Russian-speaking Foreign Service officers and communications specialists at the State Department. This parallel link, referred to by some as a "warm line," provides a 24-hour, lower-level diplomatic channel for exchanging noncrisis arms-control information — such as notification of missile testing and clarification of treaty points.

Another concept under discussion is a Joint Military Communications Link. Yet one more proposal would create direct links between the two heads of Government and their own embassies in each other's capitals.

Not surprisingly, the hot line has generated similar measures around the world. The French President has his own line to the Soviet leadership, as does the British Prime Minister. Israel and Egypt have a hot line and so do North and South Korea. And the Japanese are said to be discussing the idea of a worldwide series of hot lines.

The hot line's effectiveness is considered by many to be one of the atomic age's great successes, permitting a succession of American and Soviet leaders to secretly defuse imminently explosive situations. As defense programs go, it's a bargain, currently about \$1 million a year. ■

SECTION



INSIGHT

INSIDE



Editorials, H2-3
Congressional roll call:
Congress is in recess until Sept. 7

Sunday, August 15, 1993 Austin American-Statesman

After 30 years, the hot line to cool off the Cold War is still on call As Midwesterners clean

By Christopher Drew
Knight-Ridder Tribune News Service

WASHINGTON — When the somber U.S. president realizes he can't recall a wing of bombers launched by mistake, he opens a desk drawer in the White House bomb shelter and pulls out what looks like a big tea kettle with a telephone receiver on

top. Moments later, the president is talking to the Soviet premier, giving him the bad news about the mushroom cloud in Moscow's future and cutting a ghastly deal to avert nuclear war.

When another president tries to make a similar call, the Soviet premier is out of the Kremlin — at a tryst with his mistress. Only after the call is rerouted there, and the

president has asked the premier to "turn the music down a little," can he offer help in trying to shoot down a U.S. bomber that, in the words of its cowboy pilot, is roaring into "nuclear combat toe-to-toe with the Rooskies."

Both scenarios are from hit movies — the drama, *Fail-Safe*, and the dark comedy, *Dr. Strangelove* (released in 1964, the

year after the real Washington-Moscow hot line was started) and they lifted that extraordinary communications link into one of the most powerful Cold War symbols.

Throughout the past three decades, the hot line was the last preserve of sanity against the madness of mutual assured nuclear destruction. It embodied hope — the idea that if the two leaders

could just communicate before launching nuclear war, common sense would prevail, no matter how late the hour. It was the nuclear age's equivalent of dialing 911.

Mercifully, the hot line was never needed to stop a nuclear countdown, though it has been used at a number of tense moments — from Middle East wars to the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan — to register protests and avoid misunderstandings.

And, in this post-Cold War era, when Russian and American leaders regularly embrace before TV cameras and seem quite fond of each other, the hot line remains at the ready, staffed by translators 24 hours a day.

As both sides mark its 30th
See 30 years later. H8

After 30 years, the Cold War's nuclear 911 remains on call

Continued from H1

anniversary this month, nobody expects to use the device for its original purpose. But everyone involved thinks it's a good thing to keep around, just in case.

They also are trying to clear up a basic misconception that grew out of some movies — "The infamous red phone," sighed Army Lt. Col. John "David" Carlson, the Illinois native who heads the team of 12 translators on the U.S. end. "We have red phones here, but they don't go to Moscow."

In truth, the hot line has never been a telephone, red or otherwise, and it never has been stashed in a president's desk. At first, it was a teletype system, with operators punching coded messages on tape and transmitting them at a rate of one page every three minutes. Today, Carlson and his translators sit at a bank of computer terminals and fax machines. They are hooked to the Kremlin by two satellite systems and an undersea cable for nearly instantaneous, and nearly tamper-proof, transmissions.

And the hot line always has been based deep inside the Pentagon, at a windowless complex called the National Military Command Center, where the translators can relay messages to and from the White House through a variety of means.

Carlson, 41, presides over a large room with beige cloth on the walls and framed posters of Washington's monuments and the Kremlin illuminated at night.

He said the hot line was designed to use the written word, instead of letting the two leaders talk to each other, because it lowers the chances for a faulty translation. It also gives the leaders time to consult with advisers and prepare more thoughtful responses than if one or both of them suddenly started jabbering under the pressure of a crisis.

Every hour on the hour, the translators check the line — and match wits — by sending test messages. While they avoid tempestuous subjects such as politics and religion, they do try to trap their rivals in linguistic mazes.

Carlson says his favorite was when his crew fired off a three-part treatise on Velcro "at a time when the Russians probably didn't even know what Velcro was." The U.S. side also has sent texts on pet psychology and *Reader's Digest* articles filled with colloquialisms. The Russians have responded with complex poetry or sections of *War and Peace*.

The Soviets always have been enthusiastic about the hot line. They quickly agreed to President John Kennedy's suggestion to set it up after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

While the world teetered on the edge of war, Anatoly Dobrynin, then the Soviet ambassador to the United States, had to send critical



The nuclear hot line got its first big movie break when it was just 1 year old in the 1964 cult classic *Dr. Strangelove*, spurred on by Slim Pickens' cowboy approach to 'nuclear combat toe-to-toe with the Rooskies.' AP file photo

cables to Moscow via a Western Union courier who rode a bicycle to pick them up. After the crisis ended, Kennedy said, "We can't go through this kind of thing again."

Still, given the suspicions of the time, neither side wanted to let the other know much about the inner workings of its technology. So when the hot line was activated Aug. 30, 1963, it relied in part on Norwegian encryption boxes and East German teletype gear.

The Soviets were the first to send a message on the hot line — shortly after 8 a.m. EDT on June 5, 1967.

This was 3½ hours after Israel and several Arab nations had gone to war. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara phoned President Lyndon Johnson in his bedroom at the White House and, Johnson wrote in his memoirs, said these "ominous" words: "Mr. President, the hot line is up."

Over the next five days, Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin exchanged as many as 20 messages to bring about a ceasefire and ensure that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union joined the war.

President Richard Nixon also turned to the hot line during moments of high drama: the India-Pakistan crisis in late 1971 and the Mideast War in 1973.

In a novel move, President Jimmy Carter sent a letter over the hot line to try to develop greater rapport with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. He used it again to complain about the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan in 1979.

After the Soviets arrested U.S. journalist Nicholas Daniloff on spy charges in 1986, President Ronald Reagan sent a hot line message threatening "serious and far-reaching consequences," according

to a book, *Turmoil and Triumph*, by former Secretary of State George Shultz.

As the likelihood of superpower war dwindled — and Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton began to call Mikhail Gorbachev or Boris Yeltsin regularly on conventional telephones — so did the need for the hot line.

Former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said Bush considered using the hot line a few times but didn't, because it would have made the messages seem too emphatic in an era of personal diplomacy.

But Shultz said the hot line remains good insurance. Former CIA Director Robert Gates agrees that will be the case "as long as these two sides have submarines roaming the oceans and missiles pointed at each other."

At the hot line office, Carlson doesn't mind being the Maytag repairman of nuclear war. He visited his counterparts in Moscow last month, dining at the Kremlin. On Aug. 30, he and the translators in Moscow will celebrate the 30th anniversary by exchanging congratulatory messages.

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We are proud to a long-term, acute longer lengths of designed to comp will initially offer pulmonary, ventil complex medical program. The treat nurses; physical pathologists; the psychologists; ca

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ANNOUNCEMENT

U.S. BLOCK is offering the Basic Income Tax Course starting Sep-

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

I concur with Bundy's feelings
on this matter.

GER
March 27
12:37 p.m.

DS
Get behind you two
L

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/18/65

George:

I am against this: The Hot Line does
not need publicity.

McG. B.

Handwriting File Box 6
"March 1965 13037"

March 31, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE HONORABLE ARTHUR SYLVESTER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Proposed DoD Fact Sheet on Washington-Moscow Hot Line

I have carefully touched base here and the general feeling is that the Hot Line should be left just as it is now without any further Fact Sheet.

George E. Reedy
Press Secretary
to the President

GER:cg

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mac --

What is your judgment?

GER

Reply:

I am against this.

The Hot Line does not
need publicity

h.p.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

**MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE GEORGE REEDY
PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE**

**SUBJECT: Proposed DoD Fact Sheet on Washington-Moscow
Hot Line**

Attached are two copies of a draft Fact Sheet on the Washington-Moscow Hot Line which Defense proposes to issue subject to White House concurrence.

We receive frequent press and other inquiries about the Hot Line, and we believe the Fact Sheet will be worth-while in answering these continuing inquiries.

The Fact Sheet was prepared by the Defense Communications Agency and has been coordinated with the National Communications System Staff; cleared by our Directorate for Security Review; and concurred in by Assistant Secretary of State Greenfield.

In reports submitted to the White House over the past few weeks we have predicted that we would submit such a Fact Sheet for consideration. General Clifton, who is aware of this prediction, communicated his interest to Mr. Califano and expressed a desire to see a copy.

Would you consider this as a possible Fact Sheet for use in response to inquiries and provide General Clifton an opportunity for comment.

I would appreciate hearing from you as soon as practicable.

Attachments

DRAFT

NOTE: This is a compilation of previously released material except for the portions bracketed.

INFORMATION RELATED
TO THE
WASHINGTON-MOSCOW HOT LINE

PURPOSE. The U.S.A. -U.S.S.R. Emergency Communications Link (Hot Line) was established in 1963 to provide direct communications between the Heads of Government of the United States and the Soviet Union.

CHRONOLOGY

- May 5, 1963 - Technical discussions between technical representatives of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. began at Geneva, Switzerland.
- June 20, 1963 - Representatives of the Government of the United States and the U.S.S.R. at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference signed the agreement to establish a direct communications link between their respective capitals.
- July 13, 1963 - United States equipment supplied for the Moscow terminal was shipped to Moscow in (then) Ambassador W. Averell Harriman's plane.
- August 20, 1963 - United States officials received Russian equipment supplied by the U.S.S.R. for use at the Washington terminal of the Hot Line.

The Washington-Moscow Hot Line was activated August 30, 1963, with the initial message from the United States terminal being the conventional teletype test message. The circuits are made up of segments derived from the same routing used for normal commercial telegraph service.

MORE

They were tested by the commercial carriers for several months prior to activation of the Hot Line. A test period of one week was used to check out the circuitry and terminal equipment on a terminal-to-terminal basis immediately prior to the official activation of the Hot Line.

LOCATIONS. The permanent United States Hot Line terminal is located in the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon, which is in continuous communication with the President at the White House, at the LBJ Ranch, while in flight, or wherever he may be. The area in which the equipment is located and communications with the President are given the highest possible level of security protection. The Soviet Union has publicly announced that the Russian terminal is located in the Kremlin.

PERSONNEL. Personnel assigned to the United States terminal include an Officer in Charge of Operations, five Translator-Team Chiefs and ten Communications Specialists. Two operators and one translator are on duty at all times, 24 hours per day, seven days per week. The translators are military officers. The operators are Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine noncommissioned officers with extensive experience in teletype operations. These operators are given special on-the-job training for two weeks on the operational procedures for the terminal and on the operation of the Cyrillic alphabet machines. All personnel assigned are subjected to the appropriate background investigations necessary to obtain the level of clearance required.

MORE

CIRCUITS

a. Two circuits are used in the Hot Line -- a Primary Cable Circuit for messages and a Coordinating Radio Circuit for technical use and back-up. The Primary Cable Circuit extends from the Washington terminal by trans-Atlantic cable to London, then via Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Helsinki to Moscow. The Coordinating Circuit is a radio teletype channel via Tangiers, Africa, to Moscow.

b. The back-up radio circuit is maintained in an operational status at all times and tested and monitored in the same manner as the Primary Cable Circuit. Continuous logs are maintained on the continuity of operation of both lines and all periods of outages are investigated to determine the cause and take appropriate remedial measures. No serious outages have occurred since the line has been established.

COSTS

| | |
|--|--------------|
| <u>One-time costs</u> for equipment purchase, | \$159,849.00 |
| site preparation and installation | |
| <u>Recurring Costs</u> | |
| United States share of lease of cable circuit | 102,347.64 |
| Washington to Moscow (per year) | |
| United States share of lease of radio circuit | 52,480.56 |
| Washington to Moscow (per year) | |
| Annual cost of operation and maintenance of | 27,608.00 |
| United States terminal (not including military | |

OPERATIONS

a. The Washington-Moscow cable and radio circuits are tested hourly by the transmission of test messages. Test messages used by the United States include the customary teletype test message (THE QUICK BROWN FOX, etc.) and brief literary and textual extracts, e. g., selections from the Encyclopedia Americana. There is no such thing as a "FLASH" message via the Hot Line. All messages that might be exchanged between Heads of Government will be considered of equal importance and no precedence system will be used. Bell signals are used to signal operators for technical exchanges, testing, etc., in accordance with standard international teletype procedures. The link was established as a means of direct communications between Heads of Government; therefore, the Heads of Government are the authorities approving the transmission of official messages.

b. (The Hot Line is designed for the transmission and reception of printed messages (teletype) to preclude misunderstanding and to provide a record of communications.) All messages from the United States are transmitted in the English language and received in the U. S. S. R. in the English language. All messages from the U. S. S. R. are transmitted in the Russian language and received in the U. S. in the Russian language.

c. (Since the English language uses the Latin alphabetic characters and the Russian language uses the Cyrillic alphabetic characters, the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. exchanged equipment to permit correct printing for both languages.)

MORE

d. (To maintain accuracy, all messages are first prepared in the form of a paper tape with coded perforations and then transmitted through a tape transmitter. This permits review and checking for or correcting errors before messages are transmitted. To ensure continuity, all messages are transmitted with message numbers so that the receiving terminal may check and ensure that all messages have been received and so that in the event of a missing or garbled message the receiving terminal may request a retransmission of the message and identify it by its number.)

e. (Messages may be exchanged simultaneously, i. e., in both directions at the same time, without interference to each other.) As a character passes through the sending tape transmitter it is almost immediately printed at the receiving terminal printer. Messages are transmitted at a speed of 66 words per minute and the actual message electrical signals travel on the lines at the speed of 186,000 miles per second. Therefore, a message of approximately 250 words would require approximately four minutes for transmission. Added to this would be the translation time inasmuch as the messages are normally transmitted in the language of the originator.

f. All messages including test messages are automatically encoded during transmission and decoded during reception to ensure against a third party intercepting and decoding an exchange. The encoding-decoding equipment is of comparatively simple design of a type that is commercially

available. The principle of coding is based on the use of identically perforated paper code tapes at the sending and receiving terminals. (The same code equipment may be used for both English and Russian language because the electrical code characteristics are the same for both teletypewriter machines.)

g. Two complete sets of equipment are installed for operation and may be rapidly interchanged for operation on either circuit. Sufficient extra equipment and spare parts are provided to permit replacement of operating equipment for periodic testing and maintenance. (The Russian teletypewriter machines do not create a maintenance problem since the electro-mechanical principles of operation are the same as for the U.S. equipment. Procedures are established for obtaining normal and emergency repair parts.)

NEGOTIATING PERSONNEL. The negotiations for the Hot Line held in Geneva were headed up on the U.S. side by Ambassador Charles Stelle, U.S. Representative at the Disarmament Conference, and Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Chief Soviet Delegate to the Conference. The technical negotiators were (then) Brigadier General George P. Sampson, Deputy Director, Defense Communications System, Defense Communications Agency, and his assistant, Clifford D. May, Jr., on the U.S. side, and Ivan Klokov, Deputy Minister of Communications, U.S.S.R., and Pyotr Gobets, head of the Moscow Telegraph Office, on the Russian side.

END

Monday, September 16, 1968 -- 8:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Lester Velle, Reader's Digest, today at 1:00 p.m.

Velle is gathering material for a book on US policy in the Near East. The Reader's Digest recently published his somewhat inaccurate and overwritten but generally favorable account of your hot line dealings with the USSR during the Arab-Israeli war (attached).

You will have your own comments on policy. It would be useful for him to take away an impression along these lines:

- Peace is your overriding concern.
- We can work constructively only if there is peace.
- Israel's only long run guarantee is peace.
- Full economic growth depends on peace.
- You are supporting peace efforts, but a lasting peace can be made only by the Near Easterners themselves. One of the big lessons of 1967 was that settlements made by outsiders don't last.
- Your June 19, 1967, and September 10, 1968, speeches spelled this out.

He may wish to explore our commitment to Israel.

- We have no formal treaty, but four presidents have supported Israel's territorial integrity (and that of other Near Eastern states).
- You strongly urged Israel in May 1967 to exhaust all peaceful ways of opening the Straits of Tiran. We were heavily engaged in an international effort when war broke out. You didn't think going it alone would solve Israel's long-term problem.
- As you told Eshkol last January, you are keeping Israel's defense needs under close review. We are selling Skyhawk jet fighter bombers and Hawk air defense missiles.

He might ask your views on Soviet activities in the area.

- We want a Near East run by the Near Easterners.
- To limit Soviet influence, we have to support moderate Arabs as well as Israel, and encourage radical Arabs towards moderation.
- Tension in the Near East is the best opening for Moscow.

As a general observation, you might add that you never expected Mid-East problems to be solved easily. The Jarring mission is still the best bet for peace.

If Velle wants to get into details, you might tell him to see Hal Saunders of my staff.

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47TH YEAR

The Reader's Digest

AUGUST 1968

An article a day of enduring significance, in condensed permanent booklet form

The Week the Hot Line Burned

On two chilling days during the Arab-Israeli conflict, a year ago, Moscow and Washington were embroiled in a terrifying test of will. At stake: the fate of the world. Here, for the first time, is the inside story

Condensed from a forthcoming book, "Countdown in the Holy Land"

LESTER VELIE

FOR Lyndon B. Johnson, June 6, 1967, was "the most awesomely difficult day of my life." It was the second day of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War; and while the world was engrossed in that drama, a more momentous struggle unfolded in secret between the United States and the Soviet Union. For the first time the Russians used the "hot line" between Moscow and Washington in anger. In this confrontation—and again four days later—Premier Aleksei Kosygin and President Johnson waged a war of nerves and wills. As one Presidential adviser put it, "we moved very close to the precipice." The "most difficult day," a Tuesday, began at 5:50 a.m. when the

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M. S.F.
Memo to the President, Vol. 94
Box 39

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white telephone at the President's bedside jangled him awake. It was **Walt Rostow, special assistant for national security.** The previous day, Rostow had awakened the President at 4:30 a.m. to inform him that Israel and Egypt were at war. Now the news was equally foreboding. The Kremlin had signaled that Premier Kosygin would be sending a message within 20 minutes. The President dressed hurriedly, gulped some coffee and headed for the Situation Room in the White House basement. This consists of a conference area and an adjoining small communications center crowded with news teleprinters and "security telephones" that link the White House with Washington's intelligence community and with the Pentagon.

The hot line is a by-product of the Cuban missile confrontation. After that brush with nuclear disaster, President John F. Kennedy and Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev had agreed that ordinary channels of communications were too cumbersome to deal with crises in an age of nuclear ICBMs. A direct wire was set up, with teleprinters in Moscow and in the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon. The Russians transmit in Russian,

SINCE 1953, The Reader's Digest has published more than 100 articles by Roving Editor Lester Velic, on such important subjects as labor, education and crime. For the past year, he has devoted himself to a study of the long chain of events that led up to the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, and the aftermath of that conflict.

the Americans in English. At the Pentagon a translator stands ready to relay any Kremlin message to the White House Situation Room.

Coolheaded Men. For three years and nine months the line had remained blessedly quiet, carrying only test messages and New Year's Day greetings. Then, Monday morning, June 5, came the electrifying news that Moscow had activated it seriously for the first time. But the message was a reassuring one: The Soviet Union would keep hands off the Middle East War, provided the United States did the same. In a cautiously worded reply, Johnson agreed.

Now, on Tuesday, as President Johnson entered to receive the new hot-line message, the Situation Room was crowded with men whose combined appearance at 6:40 a.m. spelled "crisis." Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara were there. The President had also called in additional intellectual muscle—coolheaded men, tested in other crises: Dean Acheson, President Truman's Secretary of State; Clark Clifford, Truman's legal adviser; McGeorge Bundy, who had coordinated security information for President Kennedy as well as for Johnson; Llewellyn Thompson, ex-ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

Eyes heavy-lidded from two sleepless nights, Walt Rostow handed the President a rough translation of the new message. Its contents were omi-

nous. Kosygin had dropped his "let's keep hands off" line. Now he insisted that the United States persuade the Israelis to halt their advance in the Sinai and withdraw to their borders. With this demand came a thinly veiled threat: in effect, get them out of there or *we* will!

The President and his advisers were dealing with shocked and angry men. The Russians had made a vast miscalculation. They had overestimated their protégé, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and underestimated the Israelis. For three weeks, while Nasser moved 80,000 troops to Israel's southern borders and boasted that "our basic aim is the destruction of Israel," the Russians had blocked every move in the United Nations to defuse the crisis. When war came, the Russians, confident that Nasser would win, stalled U.N. efforts to achieve a swift cease-fire. For the same reason, Kosygin had suggested that both powers stand aside. Johnson had agreed. He believed the Israelis would win. The CIA, the Pentagon and the State Department, in separate appraisals, had told him so.

It took just 24 hours for the Russians to learn the full measure of their miscalculation. They were, a participant later said, "in shock." Nasser's vaunted air force of Russian MIGs was a charred ruin; his Russian-equipped armies were a fleeing rabble. The Russians had invested two billion dollars' worth of arms in the dream that Nasser would one day head a pro-Soviet

Arab empire. Now the arms were going up in fire and smoke.

Two Searching Hours. At the mahogany conference table, the President read Kosygin's message to the somber men around him. They plunged into discussion of possible courses of action, and consequences.

If Johnson did pressure the Israelis to withdraw, he would be doing what another U.S. President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, had done in roughly similar circumstances in 1957. Then, too, Nasser had massed troops and armor on Israel's southern borders, and the Israelis chased them from the Sinai in 100 hours. Then Nikita Khrushchev rattled his nuclear rockets and demanded that the Israelis withdraw, or else. The United States joined with the Soviet Union to insist in the U.N. (and privately) that the Israelis pull out—despite Israel's arguments that a withdrawal, without a prior lasting settlement with Egypt, would only set the stage for another Arab attempt to destroy Israel. On the eve of the 1967 war, Eisenhower privately confessed a doubt that the U.S. action against Israel in 1957 had been correct.

President Johnson was determined not to repeat the pressure against Israel to pull back. Negotiations and settlement must come first.

But if Johnson said "no" to Kosygin, and the U.S.S.R. then intervened, could the U.S. stand aside while the Soviets helped the Arabs annihilate two million Jewish vic-

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tims? Morally, it was inconceivable. Practically, too, it was inconceivable. Israel is one of the few democracies in all Asia and the Middle East. Since the world regards the U.S. as Israel's protector, whether the U.S. wishes to be or not, Israel's destruction, with Soviet help, while the U.S. stood idly by would send tremors of fear throughout the non-communist world. Further, if Israel went down, no other pro-Western nation in the Middle East would be safe from Nasser and the Russians. Thus, Soviet intervention would almost certainly bring U.S. intervention, and could mean war between the two superpowers.

Two hours sped by in searching discussion. With Rusk, McNamara and Rostow, the President framed a reply to Kosygin. The import: The United States would not act unilaterally. The place to seek an end to the Arab-Israeli War was at the United Nations; the method, a U.N. cease-fire resolution. (In New York, the President had already ordered U.N. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg to stand firm against any Russian pressure inside the Security Council for a forced Israeli withdrawal.)

This reply, coupled with the firm U.S. stand at the U.N., crowded Kosygin and company into an uncomfortable corner. Would the Russians come out of their corner fighting? Even while the hot-line message was going out, two Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean were ordered to move toward the theater

of war. On Monday, these two carriers had ostentatiously abandoned jet-fighter exercises to reassure the watchful Russians that the United States was sitting out the war. Now, just as ostentatiously, the USS *America*, the USS *Saratoga* and their destroyer escorts steamed east from Crete at 20 knots under a state of alert. A Soviet destroyer which had been shadowing the *America* for days would undoubtedly inform Moscow at once.

Kosygin Calling. The President plodded through his day, keeping as many of his regular appointments as possible in order to maintain secrecy. As the hours dragged, tension built. What would the Russian reaction be? Would they send bombers to the Sinai? Would their Mediterranean rocketships bombard Israel's coastal cities? Preparing for such a contingency, the Israeli defense ministry preempted hospitals in Tel Aviv, and consecrated land in public parks to accommodate some 20,000 graves.

Toward evening, in Washington, the hot line signaled the second message of the day from Kosygin. At 6:20 p.m. the President hurried once more to the Situation Room.

Kosygin, by now having learned that he faced certain defeat in the U.N., repeated his demand that Johnson force the Israelis to halt and pull back. Otherwise the Soviets would have to make perilous decisions. The Kremlin was assessing steps with dire consequences. It was clear, said a participant in the con-

frontation, the Russians were coming as close as they could to saying that they were prepared to risk nuclear war.

As the President studied Kosygin's ominous message, news came that the U.N. had adopted the expected cease-fire resolution asking the belligerents to hold their fire but making no demands on Israel to quit the Sinai. It was a humiliating defeat for the Russians. Johnson went before TV cameras waiting in the White House theater. "The vote of the Security Council," he said in an optimistic, 107-word Presidential statement to the nation, "opens a very hopeful path away from danger in the Middle East."

None of the millions listening could suspect from his words that the United States and the Soviet Union were at that moment on a collision course that could lead to war.

Back in the Situation Room at 8:30 p.m., the President found a cluster of haggard men. His advisers, in and out of the room during the long 14 hours since morning, were all bone-weary. But now Johnson bent to the task of framing a second reply to Kosygin. It yielded no more ground than did the first.

It was now 9 p.m. in Washington, 4 a.m. in Moscow. Kosygin and his colleagues, as weary as their American counterparts, probably would want to sleep on their next move.

The President returned to his living quarters, slumped heavily before a television set to watch Israel's

foreign minister, Abba Eban, state Israel's case before the U.N. After ten it suddenly occurred to him that he had had no dinner. Ravenous, he ate a Texas-style dinner of pot roast, black-eyed peas and greens. At 1:30 a.m., he went to bed.

Thus ended a day of which an aide later said: "Had we waited on Tuesday, there is no doubt the Russians would have moved—and we could have been at war."

On to Syria. As the President dozed off, it was 7:30 a.m. Wednesday in Tel Aviv. The war was roaring into its third day. Among top Israeli policy-makers, a crucial debate was raging whose outcome would set the U.S. on a new collision course with the U.S.S.R. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had formed a special four-man "advisory cabinet": the new defense minister, Gen. Moshe Dayan; the ex-chief of staff, Prof. Yigael Yadin; labor minister and 1948 war hero, Yigal Allon; and Abba Eban. As the third day's fighting revealed that the war against Egypt was already won, these men turned their thoughts to Israel's most implacable Arab foe, Syria.

For years, from their Golan Heights, the Syrians had rained artillery fire and terror on Jewish settlements in the Huleh Valley below. It was Syria that provided the spark that set off the war: the fabrication, supported by the Russians, that the Israelis were massing troops on Syria's borders. And now, as Syrian tanks attacked border settle-

ments. Radio Damascus clamored for blood: "This is a campaign of annihilation. Strike at the nests of aggression! Crush the Zionist gang!"

All but one of Eshkol's advisers supported a full-dress assault on Syria. But the dissenting voice was a formidable one—that of General Dayan. Syria was the Soviet Union's most cherished protégé, he argued. Israel had already achieved its war aims: the defeat of Nasser, destruction of the Egyptian army and the reopening of the Tiran Straits. Why bait the Russian Bear beyond endurance? Dayan convinced his colleagues. The decision on Syria was put aside.

Yet as the war entered its fourth day, the pressure to do something about the shelling from the Syrian Heights—and about the Syrians—became overwhelming. By Thursday, Dayan had bowed to that pressure. The Syrian Heights would be attacked as soon as troops arrived from the Sinai and Jordanian fronts. Thus the stage was set for the second hot-line cliff-hanger of the week, with nuclear war again at stake.

Up the Impossible Grade. Let's follow the Israeli assault on the Syrian Heights as it builds into a global crisis. At 11:30 a.m. Friday (5:30 a.m. Washington time), Israeli tanks and infantry crossed the border into Syria. The 27-hour conquest that followed was one of the most bizarre military operations in the annals of warfare.

Looking down from their redoubts—a sheer 1500 feet above the valley—the Syrians saw 35-ton bulldozers inching their way up the steep slopes to clean mammoth boulders from the path of closely following tanks. In some places the grade was so precipitous that tanks had to be winched up. The Israelis had chosen to scale the heights along a route so difficult that the Syrians had built relatively light defenses on the ridges above it. Once the tanks reached and overran these positions, they could assault the more heavily fortified areas from the rear.

Speed was essential. At any moment the U.N. might intervene with a cease-fire order. Or the Russians might intervene with missiles or MIGs.

By 9 p.m. (3 p.m. Washington time), the Israelis had done it. They had scrambled up the Golan Heights, and punched a hole through one sector of the 40-mile-long line of bunkers and trenches. But time was running short. The U.N. Security Council had been meeting for more than two hours, and a cease-fire was coming. In a change of plan, the Israeli forces fanned out north and south behind the Syrian positions.

In the White House, State Department and Pentagon, concern mounted steadily. What would the Russians do? Assurances came from the Israeli embassy that Israel did not intend to take Damascus. But the situation was growing critical.

At the U.N., the Syrians had charged, falsely, that the Israelis were bombing Damascus in preparation for seizing it—as earlier in the week Nasser had charged that U.S. planes were bombing Cairo. Their purpose: to draw the Russians into the war.

"War Paint On." Throughout early Saturday, as the Security Council met in predawn emergency session, the Syrians kept up their accusations. Then, at 8 a.m., a signal flashed in the Pentagon: a new Kremlin message was on its way over the hot line. In this message Kosygin demanded that the United States halt the Israelis forthwith. His tone was even tougher than it had been on Tuesday. It was immediately clear that this crisis was much more serious than the earlier one.

Discussion boiled in the Situation Room. The Russians, having stood by as the Israelis crushed Nasser's armies, could not remain idle while the Israelis toppled the Damascus regime. They were in an embarrassing spot with the Arabs and might take desperate measures to get off it. Those in the Situation Room who had gone through the Cuban missile crisis knew that the present confrontation held more danger. Kennedy had dealt only with Khrushchev: what Fidel Castro did or said was irrelevant. But in the Six-Day War, Johnson and Kosygin were not the masters of events. The Israelis had assured Washington that they would not attack Damascus. But they had

not accepted a cease-fire, either, and even now their forces were plunging eastward into Syria.

Over the hot line, the President pointed out that the United States could no more control the Israelis than Kosygin could control the Egyptians or Syrians. He also noted that if the Russians had cooperated with the U.S. in mid-May, there would have been no war in June.

Two more messages whipped in from Kosygin, each tougher than its predecessor. Some in the Situation Room began to fear that the Soviets might intervene not only to halt the Israelis in Syria, but to recoup all the Arabs' shattered fortunes in the war.

At this point the President made a fateful decision: on his orders, three task groups of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean headed toward the Syrian coast, 600 miles away. Two consisted of the carriers *Saratoga* and *America* with their destroyer escorts, and 100 fighter-bombers each. The other was an amphibious ready force carrying a battalion of Marines. "They had war paint on their checks, packs on their backs and were ready to go," a Navy man said.

The Bell Rings. As the President served this notice on the Russians to keep hands off, he also took steps to end the fighting in Syria. Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, acting on the President's orders, called Israel's Ambassador Avraham Harman to the State Department, where he asked him "in

the strongest possible terms" to accept a cease-fire. He pointed to the grave possibility that the Soviets might intervene to dislodge Israel from all Arab territory.

In fact, the end was near. The Israeli tanks and troops had reached their goal: the town of Quneitra, 40 miles short of Damascus. Dayan at that very moment was working out a cease-fire with the Syrians through Lt. Gen. Odd Bull, chief of staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization forces in Jerusalem.

So, as the United States and the Soviet Union stood toe-to-toe, trading "thought for thought" over the hot line, both were saved by the bell. At 12:30 p.m., Saturday, June 10, a U.N. cease-fire, accepted by Israel

and Syria, went into effect. In the Situation Room, the President and his advisers knew that the worst was over. No fourth hot-line message from Kosygin was expected; none came.

The Arab-Israeli conflict was a crucial battle in the cold war. It was hard proof that communist expansion aims are being pushed as vigorously today as they were under Khrushchev and Stalin. More depended on this war than the fate of one small nation; it also held the fate of a strategic area stretching from the Atlantic on the west to the Persian Gulf on the east—and north into Europe itself. Thus, for a brief moment the fate of the world hung on a thin hot line.

Back Talk

A NEWLY married friend of mine had a guest room that was rarely used, and the only time she bothered to dust it was when overnight visitors were expected. One day her husband went into the room looking for something, saw the dresser covered with dust and, thinking to call it tactfully to Mary's attention, wrote in the dust, "I LOVE YOU."

About a week later he had occasion to go into the room again. He found in the dust below his message the words: "I LOVE YOU TOO."

—Contributed by Sarah E. Luxton

MY HUSBAND, who is highly organized and efficient in all that he does, put up a blackboard in the garage to make notes to himself of things to do—have the dog vaccinated, buy material for repair jobs, change the air-conditioning filter, etc. I am neither organized nor efficient, and one evening when he returned home from work he reminded me of some of the things I had not done. Annoyed, I went straight to his blackboard and wrote: 1. Repair grill; 2. Transplant gardenia plant; 3. Repair fence; 4. Buy sand for sandbox—and so on, until I had a list of 12 things for him to do.

The next morning when I was getting into my car to go shopping, I glanced up at the chalkboard and found that my list had been erased. In its place was written in big letters: 1. TAKE DOWN CHALKBOARD.

—Contributed by Mrs. Bob G. Fuston

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charming pursuit
As buyer Sheila
in New York says,
one of moonbeams
\$7 billion, the estim

Thursday, June 8, 1967
Sight Translation - 10:28 am.
Received by President - 10:31 am.
Rough Translation - 10:34 am.
Final Official Translation - 12:35 pm.

The White House
To President Lyndon B. Johnson

Dear Mr. President,

Two days have passed since the Security Council's Resolution concerning the cessation of military actions in the Near East. Facts show that Israel, after the Security Council's appeal, seized considerable territory of the Arab States -- United Arab Republic and Jordan -- ignoring the Security Council's Resolution. A situation has developed which, in connection with these Israeli actions, demands not simply a cease-fire, but also a withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the armistice line. Israel's actions have placed the Arab States in such a situation that they cannot but conduct a lawful defensive war against the aggressor, who has challenged the Security Council and all peace-loving states. Until complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territory of the Arab States, in the situation that has developed, re-establishment of peace in the Near East cannot be ensured.

We have instructed the Soviet Representative in the UN to place this question before the Security Council for the adoption of an appropriate resolution.

We would like to express that hope, Mr. President, that you personally and your government will take a position which will respond to the interests of cessation of war in the Near East, and to the interests of peace in the Near East, as you have already stated.

Respectfully,

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-382

By 128, NARA, Date 4-5-95

A. Kosygin

24

Thursday, June 8, 1967

Transmitted by Soviet Molink - 12:20 pm
Received by US Molink - 12:23 pm

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081620 P

БЕЛЫЙ ДОМ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ ЛИНДОНУ В. ДЖОНСОНУ.

УВАЖАЕМЫЙ ГОСПОДИН ПРЕЗИДЕНТ.
ВАША ТЕЛЕГРАММА ОТНОСИТЕЛЬНО ИНЦИДЕНТА С АМЕРИКАНСКИМ
СУДНОМ ТИПА "ЛИБЕРТИ" ТОРПЕДИРОВАННЫМ ВЛИЗ ПОРТ-САИДА,
НАМИ ПОЛУЧЕНА И НЕМЕДЛЕННО ПЕРЕДАНА ДЛЯ СВЕДЕНИЯ ПРЕ-
ЗИДЕНТУ НАСЕРУ.

С УВАЖЕНИЕМ А. КОСЫГИН.

8 ИЮНЯ 1967 ГОДА, 19 P10 МИН.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12812, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-382
By ijp, NARA, Date 4-5-95

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE
Middle East Crisis, vol. 7
Appendix G
Box 19

Thursday, June 8, 1967

Transmitted by Soviet Molink - 9:48 am
Received by US Molink - 10:15 am

01
США/СССР
081348 4

ВАШИНГТОН, БЕЛЫЙ ДОМ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ США ГОСПОДИНУ ДЖОНСОНУ

ПРОШЛО ДВА ДНЯ ПОСЛЕ РЕШЕНИЯ СОВЕТА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ О ПРЕКРАЩЕНИИ ВОЕННЫХ ДЕЙСТВИЙ НА ВЛИЖНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ. ФАКТЫ ПОКАЗЫВАЮТ, ЧТО ИЗРАИЛЬ ПОСЛЕ ПРИЗЫВА СОВЕТА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ ЗАХВАТИЛ ЗНАЧИТЕЛЬНУЮ ТЕРРИТОРИЮ АРАБСКИХ ГОСУДАРСТВ - ОБЪЕДИНЕННОЙ АРАБСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ И ИОРДАНИИ, ИГНОРИРУЯ РЕШЕНИЕ СОВЕТА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ. СЛОЖИЛАСЬ ОБСТАНОВКА, КОТОРАЯ ТРЕБУЕТ В СВЯЗИ С ЭТИМИ ДЕЙСТВИЯМИ ИЗРАИЛЯ НЕ ПРОСТО ПРЕКРАЩЕНИЯ ОГНЯ, НО И ОТВОДА ИЗРАИЛЬСКИХ ВОЙСК ЗА ЛИНИЮ ПЕРЕМИРИЯ. АРАБСКИЕ ГОСУДАРСТВА ПОСТАВЛЕНЫ ДЕЙСТВИЯМИ ИЗРАИЛЯ В ТАКОЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ, ЧТО ОНИ НЕ МОГУТ ВЕСТИ ЗАКОННОЙ ОБОРОНИТЕЛЬНОЙ ВОЙНЫ ПРОТИВ АГРЕССОРА, КОТОРЫЙ ВРОСИЛ ВЫЗОВ СОВЕТУ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И ВСЕМ МИРОЛЮБИВЫМ ГОСУДАРСТВАМ. ДО ПОЛНОГО ВЫВОДА ИЗРАИЛЬСКИХ ВОЙСК С ТЕРРИТОРИИ АРАБСКИХ ГОСУДАРСТВ НЕ МОЖЕТ БЫТЬ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНО В СЛОЖИВШЕЙСЯ ОБСТАНОВКЕ ВОССТАНОВЛЕНИЕ МИРА ВЛИЖНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ.

СОВЕТСКОМУ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЮ В ООН НАМИ ДАНО УКАЗАНИЕ ПОСТАВИТЬ ЭТОТ ВОПРОС В СОВЕТЕ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ ДЛЯ ПРИНЯТИЯ ИМ СООТВЕТСТВУЮЩЕГО РЕШЕНИЯ.

МЫ ХОТЕЛИ ВЫ ВЫРАЗИТЬ НАДЕЖДУ, ГОСПОДИН ПРЕЗИДЕНТ, ЧТО ВЫ ЛИЧНО И ВАШЕ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВО ЗАЙМЕТЕ ПОЗИЦИЮ, ОТВЕЧАЮЩУЮ ИНТЕРЕСАМ ПРЕКРАЩЕНИЯ ВОЙНЫ НА ВЛИЖНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ, ИНТЕРЕСАМ МИРА, КАК ВЫ ЭТО УЖЕ ЗАЯВЛЯЛИ.

С УВАЖЕНИЕМ

А. КОСЫГИН
ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬ СОВЕТА МИНИСТРОВ
СССР

СМ. ЦОМ

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 94-382

NY 94-382, NARA Date 4-5-95

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-382

By lig, NARA, Date 4-5-95

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~~TOP SECRET~~

November 7, 1968

2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The Hot Line Meetings and the Middle East in New York

Participants: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation
Mr. Nathaniel Davis

Place: Office of Mr. Bundy, New York

I called on Mr. McGeorge Bundy today to get his recollections of the hot line meetings. Mr. Bundy refreshed his memory by leafing through the hot line texts and Ambassador Thompson's and Director Helms' accounts of these meetings.

Mr. Bundy said he had one difference with the Helms and Thompson accounts. He didn't think the crisis of June 10 was as dangerous as the other accounts indicated. There was no question that the Soviets were doing their damndest verbally to protect their friends in Damascus. The real difference in judgement between him and the others was, perhaps, over Israeli intentions. Bundy didn't and doesn't think the Israelis intended to press to Damascus. Bundy agreed that the June 10 message (Page 30, June 10, 8:48 a.m.) which concluded by saying that Soviet actions "including military" would be taken if Israel did not cease military action represented a more serious situation than there had been before. Nevertheless, Mr. Bundy hopes that the President will not talk about the 1967 Middle East crisis in terms of its being the most serious crisis of the past two decades. Mr. Bundy said he thought

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the President should perhaps err on the side of a very careful statement about what was going on.

Mr. Bundy read through Kosygin's June 10 message again (Page 30, June 10, 8:48 a.m.). He agreed that it was a pretty rough message. He said he supposed his real difference with others in the hot line meetings was that he was convinced the Israelis would stop.

Mr. Bundy said there was considerable discussion about what, in fact, the Soviets would be able to do to the Israelis if they did try to carry out their threat. The Russians' possibilities were not really that impressive. At no time was a conflagration immediately in prospect. In any event, by June 10 it really was about time the Israelis stopped.

Mr. Bundy reflected about the whole sequence of hot line meetings. He had come down to Washington on Monday, June 5, as a new comer and freshman to the crisis. He went to Walt Rostow's office and the Situation Room to get briefed and found a hot line exchange cooking.

There was a meeting in the Cabinet Room at 11:30. Mr. Bundy's recollection of that meeting was that it was mainly concerned with the awful shape we would be in if the Israelis were losing. We didn't really know anything about the situation on the ground. When, in the course of that day, it became apparent that the Israeli Air Force had won, the entire atmosphere of the problem changed.

It was in a way reassuring when it became clear that the fighting was the Israelis' idea and that the idea was working. That was a lot better than

if it had been the other way around.

There was a great deal of talk during the first day or so about the State Department's spokesman's statement that the U. S. was "neutral in thought, word and deed."

The hot line meetings themselves involved a very complicated process of tone and timing. It was pretty frenetic with drafts, redrafts and more redrafts. The President watched the drafts with great care. Bundy was impressed that Secretary Rusk did a great deal of the drafting -- which was particularly true of the earlier messages.

There were no real debates in the hot line meetings in the sense of choosing up sides with one group in favor of this language and another group in favor of that.

Mr. Bundy said he believes the hot line meetings were conducted well in the sense of being an effective exercise of judgement and process of decision in a time of crisis.

Mr. Bundy had no recollection of the White House end of any discussion or consultations with Ambassador Goldberg in New York.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The Hot Line Exchanges

Participants: Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
Mr. Nathaniel DavisDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 5.4
NEJ 94-382
By ig, NARA, Date 4-5-95

I called on Ambassador Thompson today at Bethesda Naval Hospital to get his recollections of the hot line exchanges between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin. Ambassador Thompson refreshed his memory by leafing through the hot line texts, and made the following comments:

At the start, the Russians made quite a point that the President be physically present at our end of the hot line before they would start the exchange. They asked more than once when he would be there. (Notice that the first sentence of the Russian text of Kosygin's first message observes that Kosygin would like to know if President Johnson was at the machine.)

President Johnson's first message to Kosygin (Page 6, June 5, 8:47 a.m.) was actually addressed to "Comrade Kosygin." Apparently what had happened was that the American hot line telegraph operators asked the Moscow operators what was the proper way to address Kosygin. They got back the answer "Comrad Kosygin." So the message went. Ambassador Thompson talked with Dobrynin, about this afterward, and Dobrynin -- who had been at the Moscow end of the line -- said he had been quite startled. The Russians wondered if the President was making a joke, or making fun of them in some way. However, Dobrynin said he guessed how it had happened.

Ambassador Thompson said the first substantive question he remembered was that of cease-fire, or cease-fire and withdrawal. On Tuesday morning (Page 10, June 6, 10:02 a.m.) the President suggested that the Soviets support the resolution Ambassador Goldberg gave to Federenko the night before, calling for cease-fire and a prompt withdrawal behind the armistice lines. Kosygin did not reply for more than eight hours. In the meantime, Federenko had agreed to a simple cease-fire in New York. In Ambassador Thompson's words, he had agreed "to a resolution Kosygin now wanted to get away from."

There was some discussion in the Situation Room, according to Ambassador Thompson, whether we should take advantage of what Federenko had done -- that is the simple cease-fire -- or whether we should stick to the message sent in the morning (cease-fire and withdrawal). Everybody agreed we should take

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advantage of what had happened in New York. There were some calls to Goldberg. The people in the Situation Room were elated -- and surprised Federenko had done what he had. There was some speculation around the room that Federenko would get into trouble. The fact of the matter was that we would probably have been prepared to accept the earlier formulation that included withdrawal. The Russians suffered from a communications problem.

What the President did in his message of Tuesday evening (Page 14, June 6, 7:45 p.m.) was to point out to Kosygin that Goldberg and Federenko had agreed to a very short cease-fire resolution, and suggest that both the Soviets and we assist the Security Council's further efforts to restore peace. What we wanted to do in this message, according to Ambassador Thompson, was simply to nail down the cease-fire.

In his message of June 8 (Page 20, June 8, 9:48 a.m.) Kosygin again called for withdrawal.

In his reply (Page 22, June 8, 11:00 a.m.), President Johnson informed Kosygin of the torpedoing of the Liberty and the dispatch of our aircraft to the scene. Ambassador Thompson comments that this was a very successful use of the hot line. We were using it in the right way, to prevent a danger of war arising out of misunderstanding. Ambassador Thompson says it made a big impression on the Russians.

The next crisis came with Kosygin's message of Saturday morning (Page 30, June 10, 8:48 a.m.). This message asserted the Russians were ready to act independently if Israeli military actions against Syria were not stopped in the "next few hours." It went on to say that such independent actions "may bring us into a clash, which will lead to a grave catastrophe." The message concluded by saying that Soviet actions "including military" would be taken if Israel did not cease military action.

Ambassador Thompson said he personally checked the Russian text to make sure "including military" was actually there. He was impressed how much greater Soviet sensitivity was to the plight of the Syrians than to that of the Egyptians. At the time, the Syrians were the apple of the Russians' eye (although this changed later). Ambassador Thompson voiced a concern in the Situation Room meeting whether the Russians might suspect that our intention was really to knock off the Syrian government.

The main focus of the discussion in the Situation Room was over what was actually happening in Syria. Richard Helms was brought into the meeting to see if he could check the situation on the spot, and verify whether the Israelis were smashing ahead as the Russians said (see pages 34 and 38). The feeling of those in the Situation Room was that the Israelis were probably doing so. Mr. Helms tried in a number of ways to reach friendly powers with diplomatic missions still open in Damascus, etc.

There was some discussion whether the Soviet message actually meant that the Russians wanted to move into the area with force. There was some back and forth about the tenor of the Soviet message, and the danger that the Russians might be testing us out. If our replies were too polite, we might look as if we were backing down under a threat. Nevertheless, the President -- while he could have gone back to the Russians making threats of his own -- chose to send the calm and reasoned message he did (Page 32, June 10, 9:30 a.m.).

Kosygin came back with a message saying the Israelis were "conducting an offensive towards Damascus, "and that action cannot be postponed."

There was some discussion whether the Soviets had actually weighed in with the Syrians to get their agreements to a cease-fire or not. A request for confirmation that they had was drafted into President Johnson's message of reply. Fortunately, the televised proceedings at the Security Council in New York soon showed that Israel had informed General Bull that it would accept any cease-fire arrangements General Bull's representative suggested and that Israel regarded the cease-fire as in effect. McGeorge Bundy drafted a paragraph for the President incorporating this information, and tension soon eased -- as it became clear that military action on the Syrian front was being concluded.

As a post mortem, according to Ambassador Thompson, there was some discussion among senior U.S. officials whether we might not have been well advised to let the Israelis move on to Damascus. It was clear the Israelis could have done so. Ambassador Thompson says this was strictly post mortem, however, and this possibility was not discussed at the Situation Room meeting.

Ambassador Thompson concludes that this crisis shows how important it was for the President to keep his cool. He adds, like Richard Helms (see Harold Saunders; memorandum of October 22) that June 10 was a time of great concern and utmost gravity.


Nathaniel Davis

Johnson

see Deary
President & movie file

Clifford Stone

The hot line between Moscow and Washington was set up so that they could go ahead and make last minute pleas, that 'we're not attacking you, and you are not attacking us.' The purpose of this was to ensure that a nuclear war would not be touched off by a UFO appearing on the scopes and being mistaken for enemy aircraft.